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1278 
DYSON LECTURE 
 
Nonhuman Rights to Personhood 
STEVEN M. WISE 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Thank you all for joining us for the second Dyson Lecture of 
2012.  We were very lucky to have a first Dyson Lecture, and we 
will have an even more successful lecture this time.  We have a 
very distinguished person I will talk about in just a second. 
I’m David Cassuto, a Pace Law School professor.  I teach 
among other things, Animal Law, and that is why I am very 
familiar with Professor Wise’s work. 
I want to say a few words about the Dyson Lecture.  The 
Dyson Distinguished Lecture was endowed in 1982 by a gift from 
the Dyson Foundation, which was made possible through the 
generosity of the late Charles Dyson, a 1930 graduate, trustee, 
and long-time benefactor of Pace University.  The principle aim of 
the Dyson Lecture is to encourage and make possible scholarly 
legal contributions of high quality in furtherance of Pace Law 
School’s educational mission and that is very much what we are 
going to have today. 
Charles Dyson was born in August of 1909 and died at the 
age of 87 in March of 1997.  He was well known as a financier, 
entrepreneur, and philanthropist.  He was considered a pioneer 
in the field of leveraged buyouts, but was best known for his 
government service.  After graduating from Pace Institute–as it 
was known–in 1930, he began a career in public accounting.  
Doctor Dyson was a lifelong Democrat who worked for President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and served in World War II.  In 1954, he 
founded the Dyson Kissner-Moran Corporation, a New York 
investment company that has become one of the nation’s largest 
privately held corporations.  Pace University’s Dyson College of 
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Arts and Sciences is named in his honor.  We are very fortunate 
to have this lecture series, and we are very fortunate to have with 
us today Steven Wise. 
He will be talking about the Nonhuman Rights Project, 
which is a very important development in the field of animal law.  
Steven Wise is one of the biggest reasons there is such a thing as 
animal law.  When I first came to animal law, I was looking for 
things to read and learn so that I could teach the field.  What I 
found were Steve’s books.  They were my foundational education 
in animal law.  As I got a little more experienced, I had a few 
ideas I thought were my own.  When I returned to Steve’s 
writing, I found they were his ideas too.  But Steven is not just a 
thinker, he is a teacher.  He is a professor at God-knows-how-
many law schools, where he teaches animal rights jurisprudence.  
And he is also a lawyer.  He has been active for thirty plus years 
in litigating animal law cases.  Now he is poised to litigate a new 
kind of animal law case, through his Nonhuman Rights Project.  
He is doing some of the most important and interesting work in 
this field and this is one of the most important and interesting 
fields out there.  It is so important there is a documentary film 
being made about Steven Wise’s work with the Nonhuman Rights 
Project by the legendary filmmaker, D. A. Pennebaker and his 
wife and partner, Chris Hegedus.  Folks of a certain age, 
including me, will remember Pennebaker’s film about Bob Dylan, 
“Don’t Look Back,” as well as many others.  This lecture is being 
live-tweeted by a reporter for wired.com on wired science and 
being webcast all over the world.  So please join me in welcoming 
Steve Wise. 
II.  DYSON KEYNOTE SPEAKER: STEVEN M. WISE  
I was delighted to receive this invitation to speak.  It seemed 
as if I was just here at Pace.  I looked back and saw that it was in 
the winter of 1985.  I must have given a really good talk because 
twenty-seven years later you have asked me back.  I have already 
looked at my calendar and I figure 2039? 
David Cassuto: It is a date. 
Steven Wise: I am booked for April though.  It is going to 
have to be May, 2039.  Call me. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/10
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I want to speak to you about the Nonhuman Rights Project.  
It is something, as David hinted, I have been working on for 
twenty-five years.  There are now, around the country and around 
the world, some sixty volunteers and staff working on this project.  
It is something we could only do in the 21st century.  We often do 
not meet each other in person.  We Skype, have conferences calls, 
email, and occasionally fly to various cities and meet in small 
groups.  It is remarkable how much we accomplish by 
communicating in a virtual way. 
I am an “animal slave lawyer.”  I have been practicing 
“animal slave law” for thirty-five years.  I do not want to practice 
“animal slave law” anymore; I want to practice “animal rights 
law.”  When I teach, I do not teach “animal slave law,” I teach 
“animal rights jurisprudence.”  This jurisprudence does not yet 
exist; it is a jurisprudence that is struggling to come into 
existence. 
Let me draw this pyramid to help explain what the 
Nonhuman Rights Project is doing.  One reason I developed this 
pyramid–I wrote about it in a Lewis and Clark Animal Law 
Review article a year and a half ago–was law students were 
telling me they wanted to write an article about “standing” for 
animals and, could I help them.  I would respond that there is no 
“standing” problem to write about.  Nonhuman animals have 
many legal problems; standing is not one.  I decided to write 
about it so others can understand what we are doing. 
When I litigate cases as an “animal slave lawyer” in the 
interests of nonhuman animals, I am not litigating “animal 
rights” cases; for nonhuman animals have no rights–they lack 
legal personhood.  They are invisible to the civil law the way a 
human slave was once invisible in the United States before the 
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and in England, before the 
famous Somerset v. Stewart case was decided in 1772, an event so 
important I wrote a book about it. 
To help explain the importance of legal personhood to my 
classes on “Animal Rights Jurisprudence,” I draw an “Animal 
Rights Pyramid” with four horizontal lines.  It sets out four 
requirements necessary for any plaintiff to vindicate a legal right.  
The first and lowest level is literally and figuratively 
foundational.  Does a nonhuman animal or any being have the 
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capacity to possess any legal right at all?  This is what the 
Nonhuman Rights Project is initially focusing on.  What 
arguments might persuade a common law appellate court that a 
nonhuman animal plaintiff is a legal person, that is, a being with 
the capacity for possessing any legal right? 
Imagine a legal person as an empty “rights container.”  The 
Nonhuman Rights Project is preparing litigation intended to 
persuade a common law high court that a nonhuman animal, like 
a human, is a legal person–a “rights container”–an entity with 
the capacity for legal rights.  In a few minutes, I will get to the 
arguments that support a finding of Level One legal capacity.  
Once a court agrees with them, we move up to Level Two legal 
rights. 
As Level One asks whether a plaintiff has the capacity to 
possess any legal right, Level Two asks to what rights is she then 
entitled?  I ask my students to imagine they are holding a pitcher 
filled with rights, ready to be dripped into the “rights container”–
our nonhuman animal plaintiff–and which was determined in 
Level One.  We must justify each right we drip into our 
“container” to a court. 
Once we have dripped in as many rights as a court will agree 
with, the Third Level asks: does our plaintiff have the private 
right to assert her cause of action?  The cases the Nonhuman 
Rights Project is considering will assert common law causes of 
action that do give private rights of action. 
We reach Level Four, the top of the pyramid.  Level Four 
“standing” requires the defendant to have committed the act that 
injured the plaintiff and can be redressed by the court.  
“Standing” is an issue so unusual that lawyers who represent 
human beings and other legal persons rarely consider it, for it 
automatically exists. 
What are the arguments for Level One legal capacity and 
Level Two legal rights?  For you gluttons for punishment, I point 
to my 1998 Vermont Law Review article that had over 600 
footnotes and was over 100 pages long.  Eventually it dawned on 
me that nobody was reading that law review article, or any of my 
others.  Imagine that!  People do not read law review articles.  
Law review articles do not catalyze social change.  I thought 
trade books might, and so I started writing trade books.  Rattling 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/10
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the Cage, in which I argued for the legal personhood and the 
fundamental rights of bodily liberty and bodily integrity for 
chimpanzees and bonobos, is substantially my Vermont Law 
Review article in the form of a trade book. 
Drawing the Line emerged after people kept asking me, 
“where do you draw the line in terms of which animals get 
rights?”  I went beyond exploring arguments for the legal 
personhood of chimpanzees and bonobos to whether other 
nonhuman animals–elephants, gorillas, orangutans, cetaceans, 
parrots, corvids, and dogs–should be entitled to legal personhood 
and, if so, where would one draw the line? 
I had long asked myself: what is it that entitles us humans to 
legal personhood?  Why do we have certain fundamental rights?  
Where do they come from?  I had no preconceptions; I wanted to 
know.  I spent six years pouring through books at the Boston 
University library.  They took me past Hammurabi’s Code, to the 
Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans, through the dawn of English 
common law, all the way to now.  These were not easy books and 
few people ever checked them out of the library.  I would leave 
them protruding an inch from the stacks.  When I returned in a 
year or three, they would be still be sticking out that inch. 
Those books helped me realize that one’s most fundamental 
rights are intended to protect one’s most fundamental interests 
and that, in human beings, these were bodily liberty and bodily 
integrity.  Bodily liberty is so important that, if you are a very 
bad person, you may be punished by having your bodily liberty 
taken away.  Bodily integrity may even be more important.  We 
may not touch other humans without their consent. 
Courts recognize that bodily liberty and bodily integrity are 
fundamental human interests protected by fundamental human 
rights.  What is a sufficient condition for having fundamental 
rights?  Not a necessary condition, a sufficient condition?  I kept 
bumping into the idea of dignity.  Dignity has many meanings.  
But dignity in the sense of being a quality imbued with intrinsic 
and incomparable value was something courts, legislators, and 
international treaties embraced.  As I tried to understand what 
courts meant by dignity, I kept encountering the idea of 
autonomy. 
5
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We humans are, to some important extent, autonomous and 
self-directed.  Judges repeatedly emphasize this.  If autonomy is 
sufficient for fundamental human rights–and if it is not, then 
what is?–it ought to be sufficient for fundamental rights of 
nonhuman beings who possess it.  I wrestled with defining the 
minimum level of autonomy sufficient for legal personhood and 
came up with what I called in Drawing the Line, “practical 
autonomy.” 
Practical autonomy has three elements.  First, one must be 
cognitively complex enough to want something.  Second, one must 
be able to act intentionally to achieve one’s desires.  Third, one 
must have a sense of self complex enough so that it matters to 
whether one’s achieves one’s own goals. 
Consciousness is implied in “practical autonomy.”  One who 
is not conscious cannot be autonomous.  It is easy for me to 
realize I am conscious.  It is harder to prove someone else is.  
Indeed I cannot prove that anyone else is conscious.  But it should 
be sufficient to show that the other being, whether mom or mom’s 
dog, acts as I do when I am conscious.  And from an evolutionary 
point of view, the closer the common ancestry is between any two 
beings, the more likely it is that their similar behaviors have 
similar mental causes. 
I am conscious.  I engage in activities that require 
consciousness.  If a chimpanzee acts the same way, I can 
reasonably conclude she is conscious too.  After all, our last 
common ancestor lived about six million years ago–not long in 
evolutionary time–and we have remarkably similar brains and 
genes. 
What are the arguments that–for example–a chimpanzee 
should have Level Two rights?  Two broad categories of common 
law rights exist, noncomparative rights and comparative rights.  
Noncomparative rights are rights to which one is entitled because 
of who one is or how one is put together, without comparing her 
to someone else.  A liberty right is a noncomparative right, and 
liberty rights are what I have been talking about today. 
On the last page of Drawing the Line is a chart in which I set 
out a “scale of practical autonomy” that runs from zero to 1.0 and 
contains Classes One through Four.  I placed my then-six year old 
son Christopher in Class Four at 1.0.  He was not always at 1.0.  
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/10
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He was born at around zero and moved toward 1.0 as he 
cognitively developed. 
I gave four specific examples of Class One great apes and two 
examples of cetaceans I met–or tried to–in Rattling the Cage and 
Drawing the Line.  I found Koko the gorilla in California, Kanzi 
the bonobo in Iowa, Chantek the orangutan in Georgia, and 
Washoe the chimpanzee in Washington State.  I tried to visit two 
Atlantic bottlenose dolphins, Ake and Phoenix, in Hawaii, but 
their captor, Professor Louis Herman, refused permission. 
I studied each as best I could and read everything I could find 
in the scientific literature about the cognitive complexity of 
typical members of their species so I could understand their 
cognitive complexity. 
By the way, I read science books and journals, including 
Science and Nature, every week.  Every animal rights lawyer 
should!  As lawyers we may spend significant time theorizing 
about the law, but if we do not understand and cannot present 
complicated scientific facts about the nonhuman animals in a way 
that fact-finders understand, we will not win.  To do that we must 
understand who our nonhuman animal plaintiffs are. 
On my chart, Class One animals run from 0.9 through 1.0.  
Their autonomy is so powerful it immediately qualifies them for 
designation as legal persons and entitlement to those 
fundamental liberty rights that protect their fundamental 
interests.  These Class One animals are not just conscious, they 
are self-conscious (that is they are conscious that they are 
conscious), they demonstrate complex abilities to communicate, 
and some or all the elements of a “theory of mind.” 
Humans appear to attain self-consciousness at about 
eighteen months of age, though it is hard to prove self-
consciousness in a nonhuman or in a very young human child.  
The gold standard is the mirror self-recognition test Gordon 
Gallup developed in 1978.  He first habituated chimpanzees to 
mirrors.  While they were under anesthesia, he placed red dots on 
their nose or ear.  When they awoke, they looked into a mirror.  
Would they respond to the red dots, and–if they did–would they 
touch the mirror or their own faces?  They touched their own 
faces.  The generally-accepted explanation is they were 
demonstrating visual self-recognition.  They realized the red dots 
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were on their own faces.  For obvious reasons, it took years to 
figure out how to administer a valid mirror self-recognition test to 
dolphins.  This feat was finally accomplished by Lori Marino, 
head of the Nonhuman Rights Project’s Science Working Group, 
and Diana Reiss in 2001.  Five years later, Diana Reiss was a 
member of a team that demonstrated a valid mirror self-
recognition test in an Asian elephant. 
These are not the only complex cognitive abilities Class One 
animals possess.  They demonstrate complex communication 
skills.  I will not call what they do “language” because there is no 
agreement on what “language” is, but powerful communication is 
taking place.  Phoenix and Ake, the Atlantic bottlenose dolphins, 
understood sentences with rudimentary grammars comprised of 
hand signals and whistles.  Kanzi uses hundreds of abstract 
lexigrams.  If you speak to Kanzi in English, he understands 
much of what you say.  In one famous monograph, Sue Savage-
Rumbaugh compared the linguistic capacities of seven or eight 
year old Kanzi to a two and a half year old human child.  Kanzi 
understood more language than did the human child.  If you 
know a two and a half year old human child, you know they are 
no dummies.  Neither is Kanzi. 
About age four, human children demonstrate “theory of 
mind.”  Theory of mind involves the ability to attribute such 
mental states as beliefs, intentions, and desires to others and to 
realize that others may have beliefs, desires, and intentions 
different from our own.  They begin to grasp that what others are 
seeing or thinking may not be the same as themselves. 
Theory of mind may be related to mirror neurons.  Mirror 
neurons fire not just when we do something, as most neurons fire, 
but when we see someone else do it.  Some scientists believe 
mirror neurons may play a part in theory of mind, in 
understanding the intentions of others, and in empathy, 
imitation, and language.  Chimpanzees and bonobos, and perhaps 
dogs, have shown they possess elements of theory of mind, while 
mirror neurons have been discovered in many animals, including 
macaques. 
Class Two animals fall between 0.51 and 0.89 on the scale of 
practical autonomy.  The closer to 0.9 they are, the stronger is the 
case that they should be treated as legal persons.  There are some 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/10
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extraordinary Class Two animals.  One was Alex the African 
Grey parrot who worked with Irene Pepperburg for over thirty 
years.  On the day I showed up to meet Alex at the MIT Artificial 
Intelligence Lab, Irene was teaching Alex to read.  Though Alex 
referred to himself both expressly and implicitly, I did not place 
even a being as cognitively complex as Alex in Class One because 
he never passed a mirror self-recognition test.  That was because 
he was never given one. 
At 0.50, Class Three animals are those we do not know 
enough about to rationally place them in another class.  From 
0.49 down to zero, Class Four animals are those unlikely to 
possess practical autonomy. 
Some readers believe I claim that practical autonomy is a 
necessary condition for legal personhood when I actually argue 
that it is merely a sufficient condition.  And why do I not argue 
that sentience is also a sufficient condition?  I do not because 
common law judges will accept autonomy, but not sentience, as a 
sufficient condition for legal personhood.  There is a practical 
problem with urging sentience as a sufficient condition for legal 
personhood.  Vast swaths of the animal kingdom are sentient.  A 
grant of legal personhood to a chimpanzee, dolphin, or elephant 
on the ground of sentience could open legal personhood to billions 
of nonhuman animals we eat.  A court would therefore reject legal 
personhood for the chimpanzee, dolphin, or elephant so as not to 
open that door.  One day animal rights lawyers may make the 
argument that sentience is a sufficient condition for legal 
personhood, but that is not where we should begin. 
So much for noncomparative liberty rights.  Entitlement to a 
comparative right is determined by comparing you to someone 
who has that right.  The most important comparative right is 
equality.  Equality demands that likes be treated alike and 
unalikes be treated unalike.  I am entitled to a right as a matter 
of equality because I am sufficiently similar to someone else, in a 
relevant way, who possesses that right.  I am not entitled to it if I 
am not sufficiently similar, in a relevant way, to someone who 
has it.  However, because each of us is infinitely similar and 
infinitely different from everyone else, when are we sufficiently 
similar or dissimilar “in a relevant way?” 
9
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This question should ring a bell for you lawyers and law 
students.  This problem lies at the center of the “reasoning by 
analogy” that makes up much of common law adjudication.  
Common law judges often feel bound by precedent, though not all 
of them do, or should.  As with any two beings, any two legal 
cases may be infinitely alike and infinitely different.  To decide 
whether a precedent is sufficiently compelling, judges may try to 
identify the relevant similarities and dissimilarities between the 
case before them and cases that might have been decided 
yesterday, last year, or five hundred years ago.  There is no “right 
answer.”  Each judge finds her own “right” answer by filtering the 
past through the vision of law she has both consciously and 
unconsciously been constructing from childhood.  Judges with 
different visions of what law is may decide cases in very different 
ways. 
The comparative right of equality has several models.  The 
“Formal Model” is a pure equality.  All classifications are 
permissible and everyone who is alike must be treated alike 
within each classification.  This model permits females or 
Catholics to be discriminated against, so long as all females or all 
Catholics are discriminated against. 
Like the “Formal Model,” the “Rational Connection Model” 
requires everyone who shares a relevant characteristic to be 
treated alike, but it goes a step further and deems arbitrary any 
action that lacks a rational connection between ends and means 
so long as a classification furthers a legitimate state interest.  
Thus, a race-based legislative classification would be acceptable 
as a matter of equality in a state that pursues a policy of racial 
segregation. 
The Nonhuman Rights Project is not interested in these first 
two kinds of equality; we are very interested in the “Normative 
Model” of equality.  This demands more than the existence of a 
rational connection between ends and means.  It requires that the 
criteria used to decide which entities are sufficiently different to 
be treated differently fit certain moral criteria.  It rejects 
differentiations that burden a plaintiff in a manner that reflects 
deeply personal social stereotypes that are biologically immutable 
or changeable only at unacceptable personal costs, and it 
prohibits classifications that consider morally irrelevant traits. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/10
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Where will the Nonhuman Rights Project file its first suits, 
based on liberty and equality?  The good news is we can file suit 
in any of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.  The bad 
news is we can file in any of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia.  The Nonhuman Rights Project has spent the last four 
years making that determination.  We have run dozens of legal 
propositions through all fifty-one jurisdictions and argued about 
what we have learned and which jurisdiction might be the most 
legally advantageous.  We will identify our final jurisdictions 
within a year. 
I had an epiphany in 2008 while arguing before the Vermont 
Supreme Court.  In that case, I claimed that my client, whose 
cats had died allegedly through veterinary malpractice, should be 
able to sue for such noneconomic damages as loss of 
companionship and emotional distress.  In the middle of oral 
argument, I realized I was involved in a conspiracy with the 
judges to pretend their decision would be made on strictly legal 
grounds, when we all knew–but no one acknowledged–that it 
would not.  The Nonhuman Rights Project’s Sociology Working 
Group and Predictive Analytics Working Groups were formed to 
address this problem. 
We have therefore spent a great deal of time not just looking 
at the law, but looking at the kinds of judges who will be making 
the law.  We do not want to encounter justices who are 
instinctively hostile to what we are trying to accomplish, and we 
do not want to encounter justices who view the common law as 
rigid and cramped. 
One reason I wrote Though the Heavens May Fall was to 
show how a great common law judge decides important cases.  
Lord Mansfield may have been the greatest judge who ever spoke 
English.  Why did he free James Somerset and implicitly abolish 
English slavery?  Lord Mansfield took no cramped view of the 
common law; as a great common law judge, he thought the 
common law was forever working itself pure.  Great common law 
judges understand that the common law is a flexible living 
organism that changes as morality changes and scientific facts 
and experiences accrue.  That is why the Nonhuman Rights 
Project will use the common law to persuade judges that our 
11
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nonhuman animal plaintiff should be entitled to legal personhood 
and certain fundamental rights. 
Common law judges divide into two large categories.  There 
are formal judges, and there are substantive judges.  Formal 
Judges understand justice furthers legal stability and certainty; 
they look to the past, believe the answers to judicial questions are 
found in law libraries or on Westlaw or Lexis, and feel bound by 
precedent, even though different Formal Judges may weigh 
precedent in different ways. 
A “Precedent Rules” kind of formal judge understands that 
justice is the following of those narrow rules precedents set.  
English judges are often “Precedent Rules” Judges.  In a 1913 
case, the Judicial House of Lords even ruled it lacked power to 
overrule itself, and so it remained until 1965.  This is why 
English law review articles may appear obsessed with 
determining what is the holding of a case and what is dicta.  Lord 
Mansfield’s inferior replacement, Lord Kenyon, was a classic 
“Precedent Rules Judge.”  “By my industry I can discover what 
my predecessors have done, and I will servilely tread in their 
footsteps,” he wrote. 
At the other end of the formal spectrum, “Precedent 
Principle” Judges also see justice as embodying certainty and 
stability, but view precedents as enunciating binding, such broad 
principles as liberty and equality–not merely narrow rules. 
Substantive Judges, on the other hand, do not look 
backwards.  “Substantive Principle” Judges see the job of justice 
as doing “right,” while “Substantive Policy” Judges see justice as 
doing “good.”  Substantive Judges may care little, or not at all, 
about what a law library contains.  They value experience, 
morality, and changing scientific knowledge.  “Substantive 
Principle” Judges and “Precedent Principle” Judges may often 
rule in similar ways, because they accept the same principles, 
though for different reasons.  The Nonhuman Rights Project is 
seeking “Precedent Principle” Judges and “Substantive Principle” 
Judges who share the principles that will lead to legal personhood 
and fundamental rights for at least some nonhuman animals. 
In other words, the Nonhuman Rights Project is seeking 
common law judges who act like a Lord Mansfield, and who see 
themselves as partners with Legislatures in their responsibility 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss3/10
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for law and justice.  These judges are subordinate in the sense 
that, if what judges say conflicts with what Legislatures say, the 
Legislatures will prevail.  But the common law flourishes in the 
interstices of statutes and in the spaces that legislatures do not 
fill.  In those spaces, common law judges have a co-equal 
responsibility with Legislatures to do justice.  The Nonhuman 
Rights Project is not seeking high court judges who will abdicate 
their sacred duty as common law judges and say, “if you have a 
problem, take it to the legislature.”  We are looking for judges 
who embrace their solemn co-equal duty to do justice. 
I am not saying, in absolute terms, that either Formal or 
Substantive Judges are right or wrong.  But the Nonhuman 
Rights Project understands that, if we want to persuade judges to 
extend or change the law to allow for the legal personhood of any 
nonhuman animal, Precedent Rules Judges will not be open to 
our pleas, and Substantive Policy Judges may not either.  These 
are judges our opponents desire. 
Our Sociology Working Group has identified every known 
sociological characteristic that academic research has correlated 
with how a judge rules.  Does gender matter, religion, economic 
status, race, where they went to law school, their career before 
they were judges, their previous experience with nonhuman 
animals, or what?  How do judges decide? 
Our Predictive Analytics Working Group is involved in the 
long and complex task of developing algorithms that might assist 
us in better understanding how a judge might rule based upon 
her judicial writings.  Thanks to the work of these two Working 
Groups, the Nonhuman Rights Project will have some idea of the 
values of the judges before whom we argue. 
So a couple hundred people have spent 30,000 hours 
preparing for the cases the Nonhuman Rights Project will file in 
2013.  Whether we win these early cases or lose them, we will 
press forward, but the time to declare the legal personhood of 
nonhuman animals has arrived. 
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